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CASE DIGEST

This CASE DIGEST provides brief analyses of cases that represent current aspects of transnational law. The Digest includes cases that establish legal principles and cases that apply established legal principles to
new factual situations. The cases are grouped in topical categories and
references are given for further research.
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I.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

MEDICAL MALPRACTICE ABROAD BY UNITED STATES PHYSICIAN IN
CONNECTION

WITH DEPARTMENT OF STATE-REGULATIONS

Gov-

ERNING TORT CLAIMS PROVIDED FOR AN INVESTIGATIVE PROCEDURE
FOLLOWED BY AGENCY DECISION-AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT HOLDS

No

CONSTITUTIONAL OBLIGATIONS TO EVALU-

ATE MEDICAL MALPRACTICE CLAIM ON THE MERITS AND IN ACCORD

WITH MINIMAL DUE PROCESS.

Tarpeh-Doe v. United States, 904 F.2d

719 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
Plaintiff was an International Development Intern with the Agency
for International Development and was stationed at the United States
Embassy in Liberia. In 1982, she gave birth to a child who became ill
shortly thereafter. The embassy physician who examined the child ordered immediate evacuation to the United States. He later consulted with
a United States missionary physician who ordered the child transferred
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to a Liberian hospital. The child was not properly treated in the Liberian hospital, eventually lost his sight, and may have suffered brain
damage.
Plaintiff brought a negligence action that was properly filed and transferred to the Office for the Assistant Legal Advisor for International
Claims and Investment Disputes. The Office investigated and denied the
claim, offering no written explanation for the basis of its decision. Relevant statutes and regulations did not require that the basis for denial be
documented in writing. Furthermore, under State Department regulations, a foreign tort claimant is not entitled to go to court if a claim is
denied administratively.
Plaintiff, pursuant to the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), appealed
to the United States District Court for the District of Columbia. Plaintiff
also claimed that the procedures for deciding her administrative claim
violated the due process clause of the fifth amendment. The court denied
both claims, but invited the plaintiff to file a motion for partial summary
judgment on the-due process claim.
Relevant statutes and administrative regulations do not require the
State Department to identify or explain any of the evidence on which it
relied in making a determination to deny relief. The district court held
that this constituted a violation of the due process clause of the fifth
amendment and remanded the administrative claim to the State Department. The court required the State Department to disclose the evidence
on which it relied in denying the claim so that the plaintiff could comment on and counter the evidence.
The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit Held: Reversed. The court concluded that no protected property or
liberty interest was denied by the administrative scheme; therefore, the
administrative scheme, though irrational, did not violate the due process
clause.
The court noted that, while protected entitlements may arise from
statutes and regulations restricting the exercise of official discretion, such
entitlements are created only when the authority promulgating the regulation has placed substantive limits on official discretion. This statute, 22
U.S.C. section 2669(f) (1990), merely provides that "the Secretary of
State may

. . .

pay tort claims

. . .

aris[ing] in foreign countries . ..

."

Tarpeh-Doe, 904 F.2d at 722 (emphasis added). Thus, this statute does
not limit the Secretary's discretion. Similarly, the regulations promulgated by the Secretary do not restrict his discretion any further. The
regulations do not provide that the decisionmaker must comply with the
findings of the investigating officer or that the decisionmaker provide a
statement of reasons for not following the investigator's recommenda-
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tions. Thus, because there are no substantive limits on official discretion,
there is no due process violation.
The court cited Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 471 (1983), for the
proposition that "mere complexity" of an administrative scheme does not
give rise to a protected liberty interest. The court recognized that a protected interest could arise based on "the consistent practice of a decisional body-even in the absence of express regulatory language or in
the face of ostensibly contradictory agency policy statements." TarpehDoe, 904 F.2d at 724. The court concluded, however, that the statute
and regulations promulgated thereunder, without more, did not have to
implicate the due process clause of the fifth amendment.
Chief Judge Wald dissented. He argued that the statute and its legislative history contained nothing that indicated that Congress intended to
permit agencies to act arbitrarily in granting or denying tort claims. He
maintained that the "theme of justice, fair play, and merit-based determinations echoes through" the FTCA and its later amendments. Id. at
725. He stated that Congress "almost certainly expected the same equity
principles to govern the administrative settlement of both foreign and
domestic-claims." Id. Therefore, he argued, the State Department regulations must be read as assuming that an administrative claim will be
decided on the same legal or equitable principles that govern court determinations. Otherwise, "they must be read as providing superhighway
procedures leading nowhere; paper promises designed to sidetrack the
intent of Congress and to mislead the supplicant who invokes them." Id.
at 726. Significance-The District of Columbia Circuit holds that the
State Department's administrative scheme requiring employee tort
claimants to file administrative claims with the Department and not providing for any further procedures once a claim has been denied, does not
violate the due process clause of the fifth amendment.
II.

SECURITIES REGULATION/ANTITRUST

THE FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT DOES NOT CREATE AN IMPLIED PRIVATE RIGHT OF ACTION THAT KENTUCKY TOBACCO GROWERS COULD USE TO RECOVER DAMAGES FROM COMPANIES THAT

AL-

LEGEDLY ENGAGED IN CORRUPT PRACTICES TO THE DETRIMENT OF
GROWERS. THE ACT OF STATE DOCTRINE, HOWEVER, DOES NOT
NECESSARILY SERVE AS A BAR TO ACTIONS INVOLVING ANTITRUST
VIOLATIONS

BY FOREIGN

GOVERNMENTS.

Lamb v. Phillip Morris,

Inc., 915 F.2d 1024 (6th Cir. 1990).
Plaintiffs were Kentucky growers of burly tobacco. Defendants routinely purchased large quantities of this tobacco not only from the Ken-

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL

LAW

[-VoL 23.1085

tucky markets, but also from producers in several foreign states. Defendants entered into an agreement with the government of Venezuela under
which two of their subsidiaries would donate 12.5 million dollars to the
Children's Foundation and, in return, the defendants' subsidiaries would
obtain price controls on Venezuelan tobacco, eliminate controls on retail
cigarette prices in Venezuela, procure tax deductions for the donation,
and provide assurances that existing tax rates applicable to tobacco companies would not be increased. The defendants allegedly entered into the
same arrangement with the governments of Argentina, Brazil, Costa
Rica, Mexico, and Nicaragua.
Plaintiffs claimed that these foreign agreements depressed tobacco
prices in the domestic market. Plaintiffs brought an antitrust action in
the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky,
claiming that the donations by the subsidiaries constituted unlawful inducements in restraint of trade. They also brought a complaint under the
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA). The court dismissed the antitrust claim on the grounds that it violated the act of state doctrine. The
court dismissed the FCPA claim on the grounds that it was an impermissible private action.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit Held: Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. The Sixth Circuit, deciding that the act of state doctrine did not bar the antitrust claim, stated
that "'[t]he act of state doctrine is not a jurisdictional limit on courts,
but rather is a prudential doctrine designed to avoid judicial action in
sensitive areas.'" Lamb, 915 F.2d at 1026 (quoting Liu v. Republic of
China, 892 F.2d 1419, 1431 (9th Cir. 1982)). The Sixth Circuit also
held that, "like the bribes underlying the civil RICO and Robinson-Pat-,
man Act claims in [Kirkpatrick & Co. v. Environmental Tectonics
Corp., Int'l (citation omitted)], the payments made by the defendants in
this case to induce favorable action in Venezuela may support the plaintiffs' antitrust claims." Id. at 1027. Thus, the court remanded the antitrust claim for further proceedings.
With respect to the claim of a private right of action under the FCPA,
the court noted that this was a case of first impression at the appellate
level. The FCPA "generally forbids issuers of registered securities and
other 'domestic concerns' . . . to endeavor to influence foreign officials by
offering, promising, or giving 'anything of value. . . ." Id. (citing 15
U.S.C. sections 78-1(a), 78dd-2(a)). When a statute does not expressly
provide expressly for a private right of action, courts will consider congressional intent, keeping in mind the four factors set out in Cort v. Ash,
422 U.S. 66, 78 (1975). These four factors are:
(1) whether the plaintiffs are among "the class for whose especial benefit"
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the statute was enacted; (2) whether the legislative history suggests a congressional intent to prescribe or proscribe a private cause of action; (3)
whether "implying such a remedy for the plaintiff would be 'consistent
with the underlying purposes of the legislative scheme' "; and (4) whether
the cause of action is 'one traditionally relegated to state law, in an area
basically the concern of States, so that it would be inappropriate to infer a
cause of action.'
Lamb, 915 F.2d at 1028 (emphasis original).

Based on the Cort factors, the court found that the plaintiffs in this
case had no implied private right of action. On the first Cort factor, the
Sixth Circuit concluded that the statute was designed to protect the integrity of United States foreign policy and domestic markets and not to
prevent the use of foreign resources to reduce production costs. Therefore, the plaintiffs could not claim that they were the intended beneficiaries of the statute. On the second and third Cort factors, the court
noted that the Senate version of the bill originally contained a private
right of action and that it was deleted from the final version of the bill.
In addition, the report of the conference that ultimately produced the
compromise bill made no mention of a private right of action. The court
thus determined that Congress did not intend to create a private right of
action. The court also determined that the legislative scheme's preference
for compliance in lieu of prosecution would be frustrated if private
plaintiffs could sue routinely.

Finally, on the issue of whether the plaintiff had other available remedies, the court noted that the international reach of the antitrust laws
"dilutes the plaintiffs' assertion that a private cause of action under the
FCPA constitutes the only viable mechanism for redressing anticompetitive behavior on a global scale." Id. at 1030. Thus, the court found no
private cause of action for violating the FCPA. Significance-The Sixth
Circuit holds that the act of state doctrine is discretionary and that no
implied private rights of action exist under the FCPA.

III.

SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION/INTERNATIONAL
ARBITRATION

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT LACKED SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION UNDER THE UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON RECOGNITION AND ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN ARBITRAL AWARDS TO VACATE
AN ARBITRATION AWARD
TION

OF

DOMESTIC

ENTERED IN MEXICO DESPITE APPLICALAW

PUTE-LANGUAGE OF ARTICLE

TO

V(1)(e)

SETTLE

UNDERLYING

DIS-

OF THE CONVENTION STATING

THAT AN AWARD MAY BE VACATED ONLY BY THE COURTS OF THE
COUNTRY UNDER

WHOSE LAW THE AWARD WAS MADE, REFERS
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ONLY TO THE PROCEDURAL LAW APPLIED BY THE ARBITRATORS,

NOT

THE

SUBSTANTIVE

LAW

APPLIED

TO

THE

Dis-

PUTE-International Standard Elec. Corp. v. Bridas Sociedad
Anonima Petrolera, Industrial y Commercial, 745 F. Supp. 172
(S.D.N.Y. 1990).
The parties to this dispute were an international business subsidiary
of a United States telecommunications company, International Standard
Electric Corporation (ISEC), and a corporation organized and doing
business in Argentina, Bridas Sociedad Anonima Petrolera, Industrial y
Commercial (Bridas). ISEC controlled more than fifty percent of the Argentine telecommunications market through a subsidiary, Compania
Standard Electric Argentina, S.A. (CSEA), and in 1978, it offered
Bridas twenty-five percent participation. Bridas agreed and the parties
entered into a shareholders agreement. The agreement provided that disputes were to be decided by arbitrators selected "by the International
Chamber of Commerce (ICC) in accordance with the Rules of Conciliation and Arbitration." International Standard Elec. Corp., 745 F.
Supp. at 174. The agreement further provided that it would be "governed by, and construed under and in accordance with, the laws of the
State of New York." Id.
In 1985, Bridas filed a Request for Arbitration and Summary of Complaint alleging that ISEC had made misrepresentations or committed
fraud in connection with the sale of stock to Bridas and that the parent
corporation unlawfully had managed CSEA. Bridas also alleged that the
parent corporation breached its fiduciary obligations to Bridas in connection with a 1984 recapitalization of CSEA and that it breached its fiduciary and contractual obligations by selling its ninety-seven percent interest in CSEA to a major competitor of Bridas in Argentina.
The ICC appointed three individuals to serve as the arbitral panel
and designated Mexico City as the location of the arbitration. The arbitral panel appointed an independent expert in New York corporate and
contract law to serve as an advisor. The panel found that ISEC had
breached its contractual and fiduciary duties through the 1984 recapitalization and through the sale of its ninety-seven percent interest. The
panel awarded Bridas 6,793,000 dollars with interest compounded annually at twelve percent, 1,000,000 dollars in legal fees, and 400,000 dollars for the cost of the arbitration. ISEC refused to recognize and accept
enforcement of the award and sought to vacate it. Bridas cross-petitioned, claiming that the United States District Court lacked subject
matter jurisdiction to grant such relief under the Convention.
The United States District Court for the Southern District of New
York Held: Dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. Article V(1)(e) of the
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United Nations Convention on Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign
Arbitral Awards (Convention) provides that "'an application for the setting aside or suspension of an award' can be made only to the courts or
the 'competent authority of the country ... under the law of which [the]
award was made.'" InternationalStandard Elec. Corp., 745 F. Supp.
at 176 (emphasis original). The court concluded that "the phrase in the
Convention '[the country] under the laws of which the award was made'
undoubtedly referenced the complex thicket of the procedural law of arbitration obtaining in the numerous and diverse jurisdictions of the dozens of nations in attendance at the time the Convention was being debated." Id. at 177. (emphasis original).
Thus, the court held that under the Convention, only the courts of the
state in which the dispute was arbitrated had jurisdiction to vacate, set
aside, or suspend the award. The court held further that article V(1)(e)
of the Convention referred only to the procedural law applied by the
arbitrators and not the substantive law that the parties agreed would
govern their dispute.
The court cited numerous cases from foreign jurisdictions (India, Germany, the Brussels Court of Appeals, France, Spain, and South Africa)
that also have concluded that a court has no jurisdiction to set aside a
foreign award based on domestic law. The court held further that "the
core of petitioner's argument, that a generalized supervisory interest of a
state in the application of its domestic substantive law (in most arbitrations of the law of contract) in a foreign proceeding, is wholly out of step
with the universal concept of arbitration in all nations." Id. at 178. The
principle underlying the arbitration process is that the merits of the dispute are not subject to review by courts, whose main purpose is to ensure
that the arbitration process employs fair procedures. Because the arbitrators in this case applied Mexico's procedural law, only Mexican courts
have the power to review and possibly vacate the award. Significance-United States District Court rules that the suspension and set
aside provision of article V(1)(e) of the United Nations Convention
grants jurisdiction solely to the courts of the country under whose procedural law the arbitration award was decided.
IV.

ALIENS AND CITIZENSHIP

IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE FOUND TO BE VIOLATING ALIENS' STATUTORY AND DUE PROCESS RIGHTS BY PREVENTING THE EXERCISE OF THE RIGHT TO APPLY FOR ASYLUM AND INTERFERING WITH THE RIGHT TO OBTAIN COUNSEL-INS PERMANENTLY
ENJOINED FROM COERCING ALIEN DETAINEES INTO SIGNING VOLUNTARY DEPARTURE AGREEMENTS AND FROM INTERFERING WITH THE
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Orantes-Hernandezv. Thornburgh, No.
88-6192, slip op. (9th Cir. Nov. 20, 1990).
RIGHT TO OBTAIN COUNSEL,

In 1982, plaintiffs brought suit in the United States District Court for
the Central District of California, alleging that Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) officials routinely were coercing Salvadorans to
"voluntarily depart" instead of exercising their right to apply for asylum
under the Refugee Act of 1980. The INS failed to provide prior information about the right to seek asylum and interfered with the ability of
aliens to obtain counsel. The INS also failed to provide telephone access
to Salvadorans, prohibited them from obtaining or possessing any written
material other than the New Testament, failed to maintain adequate law
libraries at detention centers, placed them in solitary confinement without notice or a hearing, and engaged in other tactics designed to frighten
them into electing to "voluntarily depart."
The district court entered a preliminary injunction that remained in
effect until the decision in this case. The injunction prohibited the INS
from coercing Salvadorans when informing them of "voluntary departure" and ordered the INS to provide specified oral and written notice of
their rights ("Orantes advisal") before informing them about "voluntary
departure." The injunction also required the INS to provide aliens with
a list of free legal services along with the notice. The court allowed the
aliens to retain copies of all of these documents.
Plaintiffs alleged that, despite the preliminary injunction issued in
Orantes-Hernandez v. Smith, 541 F. Supp. 351 (C.D, Cal. 1982), the
INS continued to deny Salvadorans their basic rights. Namely, the INS
continued to engage in a pattern of pressuring Salvadorans who initially
did not select it to accept "voluntary departure." The plaintiffs, therefore, sought to make the injunction permanent. The district court issued
the permanent injunction.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit Held: Affirmed. The Ninth Circuit did not reach any constitutional or statutory
interpretation issues in its analysis; instead, it relied on the "important
role of the federal courts in constraining misconduct by federal agents."
Orantes-Hernandez,slip op. at 14317. The Ninth Circuit noted that the
record supported the district court's findings and the appropriateness of
the permanent injunction. The court determined that during the postpreliminary injunction period the INS did not give the "Orantes advisal" to many class members and continued its pattern of coercing detainees to accept voluntary departure. In addition, the INS prevented
many class members from contacting attorneys and receiving legal advice. Significance-The Ninth Circuit permanently enjoins deceptive
and threatening INS practices against alien detainees, including coercion
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into "voluntary departures" from the United States.
V.

ALIENS AND CITIZENSHIP

PASSPORT IS "CONCLUSIVE EVIDENCE"
NOT

BE

REVOKED

BY

SECRETARY

OF

OF CITIZENSHIP AND MAY
STATE

UNLESS

PASSPORT

HOLDER IS GIVEN A HEARING PRIOR TO REVOCATION-REVOCATION
MAY BE HAD ONLY ON THE BASIS OF FRAUD, MISREPRESENTATION,

AND OTHER EXCEPTIONAL GROUNDS-Magnuson

v. Baker, 911 F.2d

330 (9th Cir. 1990).
Charles Myers was born in Canada in 1912. He fled to the United
States in the mid-1970s after being convicted of tax evasion in Canada.
In 1985, he applied for a passport, claiming that he had obtained derivative citizenship in the United States. Myers argued that he was entitled
to citizenship because his father was a naturalized United States citizen.
A passport examiner for the Seattle Passport Agency rejected Myers'
application. On review, however, the highest ranking officer of the Seattle Passport Office concluded that Myers was a United States citizen and
awarded Myers a passport.
Subsequently, the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS)
sought to revoke the passport claiming that it had been issued in error.
The INS asked Myers to return the passport and threatened him with
fines and imprisonment if he failed to comply.
Myers' request for a hearing was rejected by the Office of Citizenship
Appeals. Myers subsequently filed suit in the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of Washington, claiming that once the
State Department had issued a passport, it had no authority to revoke it
unilaterally. This was a case of first impression. The district court concluded that 22 U.S.C. section 2705 gives a passport "the same force and
effect as certificates of naturalization or citizenship issued by the Attorney General or a court of naturalization jurisdiction [and] would be nullified if the Secretary could revoke a passport on a whim." Magnuson,
911 F.2d at 332. Further, the district court held that a passport holder
must be allowed to challenge a revocation before it occurs.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit Held: Affirmed. The Ninth Circuit held that, under 22 U.S.C. section 2705, the
Secretary of State has the power to decide who is or is not a citizen,
because passports grant "conclusive evidence of citizenship." Magnuson,
911 F.2d at 333. The court reasoned, therefore, that Myers' possession
of a passport rendered the INS powerless to deport him. The court construed the passport statute according to its "plain meaning" because
there was no significant legislative history. Id. at 334.
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Furthermore, since section 2705 grants no express revocation power to
the Secretary, the court held that the Secretary could exercise power no
greater than the Attorney General in revoking other documents that provide "conclusive evidence of citizenship." The Secretary can revoke a
passport only if (a) the passport holder receives an opportunity to be
heard prior to revocation, and (b) the Secretary seeks revocation on the
basis of fraud, misrepresentation, or some other exceptional ground. This
is similar to the standards that the Attorney General and the naturalization courts use to decide whether to revoke citizenship and certificates of
naturalization.
According to the court, imposing these requirements was the only way
to be sure that a passport is treated in the same way as other documents
that provide conclusive evidence of citizenship. Significance-The Ninth
Circuit announces that the Secretary of State may not unilaterally revoke
a passport; may seek revocation only on grounds of fraud, misrepresentation or other exceptional circumstances; and must provide a passport
holder with an opportunity for a hearing prior to any revocation.

